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WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION NOT GOVERNED BY LIMITATION ON LIABILITY OF
LEX Loci DELICTI
The litigation arising out of the crash of a commercial airliner affords a
good demonstration of certain instances where our legal system has failed to
adjust to the needs of contemporary society. In the course of a single flight,
the aircraft and its occupants not infrequently pass through the air space of
numerous states with little intention of subjecting themselves to the laws of
such states. When a crash does occur, any subsequent rights or liabilities of
the respective parties are governed by the body of laws of the place where
the accident fortuitously occurred. This results from the settled conflict of laws
rule that in a tort action the law of the place of the wrong will be applied. The
basic justification for this rule is that it deters forum shopping inasmuch as
regardless of the forum, the relative rights and liabilities of the parties will
be determined by the same law and thus with considerable uniformity.'
The problem comes into sharper focus in the case of a fatal accident.
The right of action for wrongful death derives from statutes only, there being
no common law cause of action for death.2 Thus, in addition to the conflicts
of laws rules governing tort law which bar application of the law of the forum,
there is involved the holdings that wrongful death enactments are to be given
no extra-territorial effect.3 As a result, in the absence of a wrongful death
statute in the place of the wrong, there is no cause of action for wrongful death,
regardless of the policy of the forum state.4 While all states now have such
statutes,5 they are far from uniform. However, New York and other jurisdic-
tions have held, with a considerable degree of consistency, that questions such
as who may maintain a suit for wrongful death,6 within what period of time it
must be commenced,7 and the measure of damages,8 are questions of substan-
tive law and, therefore, governed by the wrongful death statute of the place of
the wrong.
In the recent case of Kilberg v. North East Airlines,9 plaintiff's intestate
was a passenger on one of the defendant's planes which crashed in Massachu-
setts in the course of a flight originating in New York. The Massachusetts
1. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 3 (3d ed. 1949).
2. Whitford v. Panama R. Co., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861); Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N.Y. 130,
61 N.E.2d 412 (1945).
3. Baldwin v. Powell, supra note 2; Debevoise v. New York L.E. & W.R. Co., 98
N.Y. 377 (1885); McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N.Y. 546 (1879).
4. Crowly v. Panama R. Co., 30 Barb 99 (1859).
5. Prosser, Torts § 105 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Dennick v. Central R. Co. of N.J., 103 U.S. 11 (1880); Baldwin v. Powell, supra
note no. 2.
7. Lipton v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 307 N.Y. 775, 121 N.E.2d 615 (1954).
8. Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,
224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). See also cases collected 15 A.L.R.2d 765 (1949); but see
Wooden v. Western N.Y. & Pa. R. Co., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891).
9. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
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wrongful death statute limits recovery in a wrongful death action to a maximum
of $15,000.10 In an effort to avoid this limitation,'1 plaintiff alleged in his
second count, under the New York survival statute,12 breach of contract to
carry the deceased safely, asking $150,000 in damages. Plaintiff's contract
argument was not for the wrongful death of the deceased, but for breach of
contract as at common law, the damages being the deceased's loss of earning
power for the remainder of his normal life expectancy. Special Term held that
the action for contract was proper, relying on case law permitting such contract
actions in personal injury cases.13 The Appellate Division reversed, however,
and granted defendant's motion to dismiss the second count. 14 They stated
that although the second cause of action had "been seductively clothed in form
ex contractu," the gravamen of the action was tort for negligently causing death
and was, therefore, governed by the lex loci delicti.'3 The Court of Appeals
affirmed. 16
After dismissing the contract action, Chief Judge Desmond, writing for
the majority of the Court, in significant dicta stated that although plaintiff
must sue under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, the New York Court
was not bound by that statute's limitation on damages. Frankly stating what
is undoubtedly the actual basis for such dicta, that Court said, "Modern con-
ditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the traveling ciizen of this
state to the varying laws of other states through and over which they move."'
1 7
The Court then looked to New York's strong public policy against such limi-
tation as embodied in the New York Constitution,' 8 and concluded that "for
our courts to be limited by tfus damage ceiling (at least as to our own domi-
ciliaries) is so completely contrary to our public policy that we should refuse
to apply that part of the Massachusetts law."' 9
10. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229 § 2 (1958):
If the proprietor of a common carrier of passengers . . . by reason of his or its
negligence ... causes the death of a passenger, he or it shall be liable in damages
in the sum of not less than 2,000 dollars nor more than 15,000 dollars, to be
assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant ...
The Statute has since been amended to raise the upper limit of recovery to $20,000.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229 § 2 (1960).
11. See also Snow v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); and
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) arising out of the
same accident as the principal case. Both were dismissed as to contract actions on grounds
that although such actions sounded in contract the gravamen of the action was in tort.
12. N.Y. Dec. Estate Law § 116:
Actions of account, and all other actions upon contract, may be maintained by and
against executors, in all cases in which the same might have been maintained, by or
against their respective iestators.
13. Dyke v. Erie R. Co., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871).
14. 10 A.D.2d 261, 198 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1st Dep't 1960).
15. Id. at 262, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
16. Supra note 9.
17. Supra note 9 at 39, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
18. N.Y. Const. art. I. § 16:
The right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting in death,
shall never be abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation.
19. Supra note 9 at 41, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
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An exception to the rule, that as to substantive rights the lex loci controls
and will be enforced in the courts of the forum, occurs when the public policy
of the forum forbids it.20 Invoking this exception and relying on such cases
as Mertz v. Mertz,21 the Court refused to enforce one of the provisions of the
Massachusetts statute as to damages.22 As a further basis for refusing to
enforce the limitation of the Massachusetts statute the Court classified the
measure of damages as procedural. Under conflict of laws rules the procedural
laws of the forum governs.2 3 It is not clear, however, whether a remedy pro-
vided by law is a matter of substance or procedure24 and the forum normally
makes this determination for itself.25 Finding authority both ways on the ques-
tion of classifying the measure of damages in wrongful death cases, 20 and find-
ing no controlling New York decision, the Court determined that it was free
to decide the question in accordance with New York's public policy.
Judge Fuld, concurring, 27 examined the wrongful death and breach of
contract problem and said that while theoretically a contract action might be
argued to exist, such an argument was foreclosed by precedent and he there-
fore agreed with the majority that the second count was properly dismissed.
However, he believed that there was not warrant or justification for the Court
sua sponte considering the question as to the measure of damages.2 8
Although concurring in result, Judge Froessel20 argued that by improperly
considering the cause of action for wrongful death which was not raised by
either party, the Court was exercising discretion usually exercised below-a
procedure not only unprecedented but beyond the province of the Court. He
further argued that on various occasions the Court had affirmed that the meas-
ure of damages in such cases is a question of substantive law.3 0 Also, in con-
20. Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943); Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co., supra note 8.
21. 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936). This case holds in substance that the policy
of the forum is found in its laws and judicial opinions and a cause of action contrary to
that cannot be maintained in this state. This should be compared with the test of the
Loucks case, supra note 8 at 111, 120 N.E. at 202 (which was distinguished in the Mertz
case) that to render foreign law unenforceable as contrary to public policy it must "violate
some principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal." The Kilberg decision appears to be a departure from the
stricter test of Loucks and therefore would give the forum greater leeway in refusing to
apply the substantive law of a sister state.
22. Supra note 9 at 40, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
23. Lefler, Conflict of Laws § 110 (1959).
24. Id. § 60.
25. Id. § 58; Murry v.,N.Y., Ontario & W. R. Co., 242 App. Div. 374, 275 N.Y. Supp.
10 (1st Dep't 1934).
26. Supra note 9 at 41, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
27. Supra note 9 at 42, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
28. Ibid.
But as I have already indicated this does not entitle a court to discuss or decide
an issue which not only is not argued by the parties, but actually is not raised or
presented by the record.
29. Supra note 9 at 46, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
30. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 8; Royal Ind. Co. v. Atchison T. & S.F. R.
Co., 272 App. Div. 246, 70 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 619, 75 N.E.2d
631 (1947); Whitford v. Panama R. Co., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861).
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sidering a question which is in principle identical to that involved in the instant
case, the Court had upheld decisions to the effect that interest from the time
of death may not be added to the amount of recovery when it is not so pro-
vided in the foreign statute.3 ' Judge Froessel stated that the decision of the
Court conflicted with the overwhelming weight of authority in the United
States which follows the principle that the lex loci delicti governs not only the
existence of the cause of action for wrongful death but also the measure of
damages.32 He further argued that, inasmuch as the right to bring such an
action derives entirely from statute, a limitation on the amount of damages
recoverable is tantamount to a provision that there shall be no cause of action
for wrongful death beyond this amount.
"The size of the right is a part of the right" and, therefore, the "measure
of damages should be treated as a substantive rather than a procedural
matter." 33 This theory becomes even clearer upon examination of the basic
philosophies underlying the New York and Massachusetts statutes. The New
York action for wrongful death is based upon the original English enactment,
Lord Campbell's Act, which confers a cause of action upon the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased for the benefit of certain specified relatives. Its
purpose is compensatory, the damages being measured by the loss sustained
by the surviving beneficiaries as the result of the wrongful death. For a brief
period, the amount recoverable in damages was limited by statute.3 4 In 1894,
however, the State Constitution was amended to provide that this right of action
should never be abrogated and that the amount recoverable shall not be sub-
ject to statutory limitation.35 This strong public policy contrary to limiting the
damages for wrongful death can be justified in view of the compensatory nature
of the action. This same public policy, however, has little justification when
applied to the Massachusetts statute. That statute, enacted prior to Lord Camp-
bell's Act and in no way related to it,36 is punitive rather than compensatory.
Its compensatory features are limited to the fact that the cause of action is
conferred for the benefit of the family of the deceased. The damages, however,
are not computed according to the loss sustained, but, rather, according to "the
degree of culpability" of the defendant.37 In no event can the punishment be
less than $2,000 nor more than $15,000. It is noteworthy that this longstanding
measure of damages was omitted from the statute when revised in 194738 but
was soon reinstated in 1949. 39 Thus there can be little doubt as to the intent
31. Kiefer v. Grand Truck R. Co., 12 App. Div. 28, 42 N.Y. Supp. 171 (4th Dep't
1896), aff 'd, 153 N.Y. 688, 48 N.E. 1105 (1897).,
32. Supra note 8.
33. Lefler, supra note 23, § 65.
34. Laws of 1849, ch. 256.
35. Supra note 18.
36. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 8 at 104, 120 N.E. at 199.
37. Supra note 10.
38. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 506 § 1A (1947).
39. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 427 § 2 (1949).
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of the Massachusetts legislature. The conflict between the theory of this
statute and the public policy of New York which occurs on the question of
damages is then considerably more fundamental than the decision of the Court
indicates. The effect of impressing the lex loci delicti with the public policy
of the forum is to substantially reconstruct the Massachusetts statute from its
very foundations.
Another policy consideration is the effect, of the forum changing the
applicable law, on the parties. Declining to enforce a right created by foreign
law, however great the resulting inconvenience, in theory does not amount to
a deprivation of the right as the plaintiff may still have recourse to the foreign
court. The converse situation, expansion of a right derived from foreign law, is
quite a different matter, in view of the correlative broadening of the defend-
ant's liability. The same set of operative facts should not give rise to different
degrees and bases of liability depending solely on the forum in which liability
is judicially determined.
A possible alternative to the Kilberg dilemma would be legislation pro-
viding for a cause of action in contract, similar to the plaintiff's second count
here, with the damages being unlimited. Other alternatives are federal legisla-
tion or uniform state laws governing recovery for injuries resulting in death
received in an airplane crash. The basic problem, however, is not one for
judicial solution.
The Kilberg decision upholds the state's public policy of prohibiting the
imposition of limits on recovery of damages in wrongful death actions. How-
ever, by disregarding the Massachusetts Act's provision as to damages and
in its place applying New York's public policy, the Court is inviting forum-
shopping and defeating the objective of conflict of laws rules, uniformity of
result.40
P.W.D.
PUBLIC POLICY DID NOT BAR APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW IN CONTRACT
ACTION
In Haag v. Barnes,41 an action for support against the putative father of
an illegitimate child, the defense was an agreement between the parties for
support of the child, fully performed, and in which plaintiff relinquished the
right to bring any action for support. Since the agreement was not court ap-
proved as required by New York law,42 it would not bar the suit under the
internal law of New York. The agreement was made in Illinois, however, where
both parties resided at the time, and it specifically provided that it should be
40. Goodrich, supra note 1, § 4.
41. 9 N.Y.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
42. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 121 and New York City Criminal Courts Act § 63 provide:
An agreement or compromise made by the mother .. .shall be binding only when
the court shall have determined that adequate provision has been made.
